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ABSTRACT 
 
Responses to recent infectious disease outbreaks, such as to Influenza Pandemic 2009 and the 
on-going Ebola outbreak in West Africa, reveal the need for new and strengthened approaches to 
risk communication and governance. The article argues for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of 
current approaches to risk communication, preparedness planning and response. It calls for a 
reframing of the way we currently identify and respond to outbreaks around a set of core 
behaviour-based response patterns. This new model moves away from the current risk 
communication focus on a plethora of agent-specific threats to five generic response patterns that 
are based on socially relevant response activities such as 1) controlling vectors, 2) enhancing 
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hygiene, 3) isolation of the sick, 4) protection of the well, and 5) systemic protection of people and 
their environments. Emphasis is placed on gaining relevant insights into the context specific needs 
of different communities related to these five patterns. Governance structures are then built and 
evaluated based on their capacity to collect, communicate, share and prepare the public to take 
appropriate action related to the five different patterns before, during and after an event. Reframing 
risk communication and preparedness approaches around a better understanding of the 
determinants of these general behavioural patterns in infectious control could strengthen infection 
control literacy, response competence and build resilience of both individuals and health systems 
to address future epidemics, pandemics and other public health threats. 
 
 
Keywords: Governance; risk communication; generic preparedness; pandemic preparedness; 
influenza pandemic; public health. 
 
1. SIGNIFICANCE TO PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
The current rationale of risk communication and 
preparedness planning builds on a plethora of 
agent specific threats. This requires continuous 
expert assessment and recommendations and 
thus increases the dependence on experts and 
reinforces the current dominance of the 
biomedical paradigm.  
 
This article describes a new social action model 
that is built on five generic response patterns. 
These “patterns” describe specific socially 
relevant individual behaviour and public health 
system activities that can guide risk 
communication approaches before, during and 
after an event. The benefits of applying this new 
risk communication approach would be to 
improve the infection control literacy and 
competence of both individuals and public health 
systems to address and support socially relevant 
actions in each of the five areas. Developing 
such competencies could reduce dependence on 
experts, shift biomedical paradigm to more 
socially relevant approaches and help build and 
strengthen peoples’ and systems’ resilience in 
addressing future epidemics, pandemics and 
other public health threats.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
Recent infectious disease outbreaks, such as the 
Influenza Pandemic 2009 (“influenza A 
[H1N1]pdm09”) and the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa highlight the fact that current risk 
communication, governance and structural 
approaches to preparedness and response 
planning for infectious disease outbreaks are not 
sufficient to prepare for or adequately engage 
with the public and various stakeholders (e.g. 
travel, trade, international organizations, etc.). 
This has had a significantly negative impact on 
the speed, effectiveness and efficiency of 
response measures [1]. The knowledge and 
perception gap between what public health 
officials consider important and what the key 
drivers of affected communities actually are, was 
wide during Influenza pandemic and is even 
wider (and almost disconnected) during the 
Ebola outbreak response [2-4]. 
 
National and international preparedness planners 
have started examining how underlying systems 
and structures are contributing to response 
failures. Problems related to one-directional 
communication, lack of trust and relationship 
building between providers and people and 
between relevant sectors and stakeholders are 
being identified as higher priority issues needing 
attention. Experts are calling for better 
engagement strategies with communities, the 
need for better “listening”, on-going involvement 
and more culturally sensitive action oriented 
recommendations [5].    
 
While these change suggestions are most 
definitely a move in the right direction we believe 
that implementing them requires new 
governance and communication approaches. We 
argue for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of 
preparedness planning that builds on more 
systematic, collaborative and smarter 
approaches to governance for health and a 
reframing of how we communicate infectious 
threats with the public [6]. 
 
In this article we particularly focus on how 
communication could be reframed from its 
current fixation on multiple agent-based 
response plans to a generic social action-based 
preparedness planning paradigm. We identify 
five infection control patterns that people can 
adopt to protect themselves and others. These 
patterns are determined by socially relevant 
action people can take and not solely based on 
conventional scientific distinctions into virus, 
bacteria or parasites nor on the epidemiological 
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rational of transmission patterns (vector-borne 
diseases, direct contact, etc.). The key question 
addressed in each of the patterns in our 
approach is what actions people can take to 
protect themselves, their families and 
communities? The risk communication challenge 
focuses on gaining relevant insights into the 
context specific needs of different communities 
related to these five patterns. Governance 
structures are then built and evaluated based on 
their capacity to collect, communicate, share and 
prepare the public to take appropriate action 
related to the five different patterns before, 
during and after an event.  
 
2.1 Hypothesis   
 
It is our hypothesis that risk communication 
governance systems that adopt a socially 
relevant pattern of infection control approach will 
enable people to become more independent and 
informed participants and thereby lead to earlier, 
faster, smoother and smarter responses [7]. 
 
3. INTRODUCTION OF A GENERIC 
APPROACH: FROM AGENT-BASED 
PLANNING TO AN ACTION-BASED 
GENERIC PREPAREDNESS 
 
To this end we propose to modify the conceptual 
framing currently surrounding public health 
infectious disease risk communication 
governance. We propose that - rather than a 
directive agent-based approach - an action-
based approach should be adopted in 
preparedness planning and response. Our new 
approach is not based on single causative 
agents, but on pragmatic, socially relevant 
patterns of infection control. We argue for a more 
generic action oriented preparedness planning 
model. 
 
3.1 Socially Relevant Patterns of Infection 
Control – A Framework 
 
3.1.1 Patterns of infection control  
 
We suggest different patterns based on socially 
relevant infection control behaviours related to 
actual mode of transmission and needed 
epidemiologically based preventive actions. We 
first divide diseases between those that are not 
or only rarely transmissible between humans and 
those that are human-to-human transmissible. 
We then suggest five behavioural patterns 
related to the key threat element (e.g. a known 
vector) and the core social prevention action 
required (e.g. vector control). 
 
3.1.2 Five socially defined patterns  
 
3.1.2.1 Not (1.) or rarely (2.) transmissible 
between humans 
 
1. Control vectors: Some diseases, such as 
Dengue fever, Malaria or Chikungunya 
fever, are transmissible via animate 
vectors - a direct transmission from human 
to human does not take place. Infection 
control measures are based on the 
controlling and avoidance of vector 
transmission, e.g. using insecticides, 
repellents, disinfection, decreasing room 
temperature, draining reservoirs, etc. 
 
Pattern objective: Prevent transmission by 
a known vector 
Pattern action: Control vector 
 
2. Enhance hygiene: Some diseases, such 
as Cholera or Salmonellosis, are 
transmissible via indirect contact only 
(contaminated water or food, Bush Meat, 
handles, clothes etc.). Hands/body fluids 
are direct possibilities of transmission and 
a transmission from human to human is 
extremely rare, if ever. The governing 
principle of infection control here is the 
prevention of indirect (and direct) 
transmission, e.g. provision of clean water, 
cleaning of contact surfaces, increased 
hygiene including avoidance of 
handshaking etc. 
 
Pattern objective: Prevent transmission of 
a known source 
Pattern action: Enhance hygiene 
 
3.1.2.2 Transmissible between humans              
(3., 4., 5.) 
 
3.  Isolation of sick: A large variety of 
diseases are transmissible from a sick 
person to other humans via direct contact. 
Ebola virus is one example. The governing 
principle of infection control is to avoid 
contact with a sick person.  
 
Pattern objective: Prevent contact with sick 
humans 
Pattern action: Isolation of sick 
 
4.  Prevent exposure to sick humans: 
Some diseases are very easily 
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transmissible. Exposure to a sick person 
can facilitate an infection. The Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and 
the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS) are examples of diseases that are 
transmissible from a sick person to another 
human via droplets and aerosols but only 
after the onset of typical signs of the 
disease. Infection control actions here aim 
at detecting early signs and symptoms and 
prevent the airborne transmission, e.g. 
increased hygiene including masks and 
gloves, etc. 
 
Pattern objective: Prevent exposure to sick 
humans  
Pattern action: Protect the well 
 
5.  Prevent exposure: Some diseases are 
transmissible from human to human via 
droplets and aerosols before the onset of, 
or without, symptoms. Influenza and 
Measles are examples. The infection 
control approach here is likely to be highly 
sophisticated and targeted at the 
avoidance of air-borne transmission and 
contact, e.g. increasing levels of general 
hygiene, masks, gloves, interpersonal 
spatial distancing (not social distancing).  
 
Pattern objective: Prevent exposure  
Pattern action: Systemic protection of 
people and their environments.   
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Reframing risk communication approaches 
around these five social behavioural patterns 
allows for a simpler, more accessible framework 
for action. It requires, however, an understanding 
of the social, cultural, religious customs and 
belief systems contexts within which needed 
change in the different behaviour patterns might 
be sought. Without such understanding risk 
communications will falter. During the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, for instance, people did 
not adopt the recommendation to avoid touching 
their sick relatives as such behaviours go against 
traditional community care, burial practices and 
religious beliefs. Changing such traditional 
patterns requires a new approach to risk 
communication. Such changes are only 
realisable through better and more collaborative 
governance and risk communication systems 
that can find a common ground to develop 
solutions that work for both sides: the infection 
control side – and the people side.  
 
5. LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTH 
 
Utilising these five relevant patterns provide a 
framework and platform for identifying and 
addressing the key principles from the infection 
control side (e.g. prevent transmission by a 
known vector) and the people side (e.g. vector 
control). The exact changes required will depend 
on the different settings and societies and need 
to be developed with people and their public 
health services. Such preparedness planning 
requires more than preparing and delivering 
health messages: it requires governance and risk 
communication systems that understand the 
social dimensions and have taken steps to build 
on-going relationships with affected communities 
so as to be able to explore pragmatic and 
realistic options. A key advantage of reducing 
risk communication to five relevant patterns is 
that it can empower communities with a new 
independence from experts. Risk  
communication focussed on single diseases and 
expert opinions providing scientific information 
about the particular causative agent is too often 
one-directional. These five social action related 
patterns of infection control demand dialogue 
and represent a new conceptual approach that 
facilitates the development of context specific 
collaborative and enabling risk communication 
for outbreaks with public health relevance.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Reframing how we conceptualise generic 
preparedness around an agreed set of 
behavioural patterns in infectioun control has the 
potential to improve the preparedness planning 
for public health emergencies and may help build 
and strengthen resilience of the general public to 
address future epidemics, pandemics and other 
public health threats. Enhancing capacities to 
support needed behaviour changes through the 
use of collaborative risk communication 
approaches can also help strengthen public 
health systems on all levels of governance, from 
the local to global. 
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